Iran still has the power to cause pain, but its shrinking economy may no longer provide enough time or money to resist American pressure indefinitely.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is betting that the United States can end the war with Iran by exploiting the damage already inflicted on the regime’s military, nuclear program and economy. His new campaign, Operation Economic Outcast, is intended to close Iran’s remaining financial escape routes and force Tehran to choose between an enforceable agreement and economic collapse.

There are reasons to believe it could work.

Sanctions alone have a decidedly mixed history. Cuba has endured an American embargo for more than six decades without abandoning communism. North Korea has survived despite isolation and recurring famine. Authoritarian governments are often willing to impoverish their populations rather than relinquish power.

Iran’s position, however, is different. It is not entering this pressure campaign with an intact economy and years to prepare. It has just endured nearly six months of war. Its military infrastructure has been badly damaged, its oil exports restricted and its commercial connections disrupted. Factories, transportation networks and power facilities need repair precisely when the government is finding it harder to obtain money and equipment.

The Iranian rial fell Monday to a record 2.02 million to the dollar on the informal market. Iran’s own statistics agency reported annual inflation of 66 percent in July, while food prices had increased by 128 percent. These are not abstract financial indicators. They mean disappearing savings, unaffordable groceries and businesses unable to plan from one week to the next.

Bessent intends to accelerate that crisis through secondary sanctions. Foreign institutions will be forced to choose between doing business with Iran and retaining access to the American financial system. For most international banks and major corporations, it is not much of a choice. Iran’s economy is simply not valuable enough to justify losing access to dollars and the world’s largest consumer market.

The United Arab Emirates may have demonstrated how quickly the plan can change Iran’s circumstances. After a telephone conversation between President Trump and Emirati leader Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE suspended trade with Iran. Dubai has long served as a vital re-export and financial center for Iranian businesses. Closing that route will make it harder for Iran to import machinery, medicine and industrial components or move money through the international system.

China remains the larger test. It is Iran’s most important oil customer and possesses the financial weight to blunt American pressure. Yet even Beijing must calculate carefully. China may denounce the sanctions while its internationally exposed banks and companies quietly reduce Iranian business. Bessent does not need China to announce complete compliance. He only needs Chinese buyers to purchase less Iranian oil, demand steeper discounts and make every transaction more difficult.

Iran still possesses one formidable counterweapon: the Strait of Hormuz. By threatening tankers and restricting traffic, Tehran can raise energy prices around the world and impose political costs on Trump before the November midterms. Iranian official Mohsen Rezaei has threatened to stop every drop of Gulf oil if other countries join America’s “economic war.”

That threat reveals both Iran’s remaining power and its increasing desperation. Disrupting Hormuz hurts Iran too. The country needs imported goods, regional trade and oil revenue. Every attack frightens away shipping, raises Iran’s own costs and pushes its Gulf neighbors closer to Washington.

The regime’s decision to broadcast an assassination threat against Barron Trump is another indication that its strategy is becoming more personal and reckless. Iranian state television reportedly aired a segment purporting to identify Barron’s locations, acquaintances and security arrangements while promoting a claimed $10 million reward for his murder. Whether an operational bounty actually exists remains unverified. Iran’s responsibility for broadcasting the threat through its state-controlled media is much clearer.

If Tehran imagined that threatening the president’s 20-year-old son would soften Trump’s war posture, it badly miscalculated. Trump has never responded to personal intimidation by becoming more conciliatory. The broadcast is far more likely to harden his position, strengthen his determination to isolate the regime and make concessions politically impossible unless Iran offers something substantial in return.

It may also help Bessent recruit reluctant allies. Iran would like to portray itself as the victim of indiscriminate American economic warfare. Using state television to encourage the assassination of a president’s civilian son makes that argument considerably less persuasive.

Operation Economic Outcast still carries risks. Iran could attack more ships, strike Gulf infrastructure or attempt terrorism abroad. Economic hardship could fall primarily upon ordinary Iranians without forcing the regime to capitulate. Washington must also prevent a temporary Hormuz agreement from granting Iran permanent authority over an international waterway.

Nevertheless, Bessent’s plan has a plausible path to success because several forms of pressure are converging at once. Iran’s military has been weakened. Its currency is collapsing. Its regional commercial outlets are closing, while its government faces the rising cost of reconstruction and public discontent.

The objective should not be Iran’s poverty for its own sake. Success means reopening Hormuz, ending attacks on American interests, restricting the nuclear program and preventing Iran from rapidly rebuilding its military capabilities.

Bessent believes financial power can complete what military power began. If the administration can keep Gulf oil moving while steadily reducing Iran’s own revenue, time will stop working in Tehran’s favor. Iran may still talk defiantly, but defiance cannot stabilize its currency, rebuild its factories or feed its people. Eventually, the regime may discover that a negotiated retreat is preferable to national ruin.

(Contributing writer, Brooke Bell)